Practical Ethics
Heavy Petting by Peter Singer
Wednesday 22 September from 5-6.30pm in ib3.307
Over the past few weeks the Deakin Philosophical Society has discussed a number of ethical issues, mining various approaches in moral philosophy in an attempt to solve these pressing problems. Last week we discussed virtue ethics as a solution to tragic dilemmas (where one is forced to choose between two morally repugnant options). This Wednesday 22 September we’ll continue to discuss practical ethics, focusing on Peter Singer’s 2001 essay questioning the (im)morality of bestiality. Heavy Petting challenges the taboo surrounding inter-species sexual relations. Find this brief essay (polemic?) online at www.utilitarian.net/singer/by/2001—-.htm. Here’s an excerpt:
…there are many ways in which we cannot help behaving just as animals do — or mammals, anyway — and sex is one of the most obvious ones. We copulate, as they do. They have penises and vaginas, as we do, and the fact that the vagina of a calf can be sexually satisfying to a man shows how similar these organs are. The taboo on sex with animals may … have originated as part of a broader rejection of non-reproductive sex. But the vehemence with which this prohibition continues to be held, its persistence while other non-reproductive sexual acts have become acceptable, suggests that there is another powerful force at work: our desire to differentiate ourselves, erotically and in every other way, from animals.
You may wish to take Singer’s position, or argue against it.
This should be an interesting discussion, if we can keep it philosophical.
In addition, a few of you were asking about the Melbourne School of Continental Philosophy Spring Workshop. Here are the details:
MSCP Spring Workshop 2010
Humanism/Anti-Humanism: Philosophical Perspectives
Friday 1 October from 11am-4pm
The MSCP Workshops are free and open to all. No RSVP necessary.
When:
11am-4pm, Friday, 1st of October
Where:
Room 109, New Law School Building,
University Square, 185 Pelham St,
Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne
Participants:
Dr Geoff Boucher, Deakin University
Bryan Cooke, Social Theory, University of Melbourne
Dr Cameron Shingleton, MSCP
Ricki Sebold, Latrobe University
Dr Andrea Leon-Monterro, MSCP
Dr Matthew Sharpe
(Chair), Deakin University
Since the end of the Second World War, an unmistakable feature of much moral, juridical and political discourse has been the near-constant appeal to “humanity” as the yardstick and sometimes the source of value, justice and “right”.
But what do we mean today when we speak of “humanity”? What image or concept of the human is invoked when we talk of “human rights”, or “humanitarian” intervention, (or, as in philosophy, of “human finitude”?) More importantly: what is the effect of our notions of and appeals to “the human” in the legal, metaphysical and ethical situations in which these ideas are not only invoked but deployed?
This year’s MSCP Spring workshop on the topic of “humanism” and “anti-humanism” in modern European thought will engage with these topics and many more. The panel will take the work of philosophers as the point of departure for a wide-ranging discussion of humanity and the inhuman, immanence and transcendence, finitude and infinity, as these oppositions are played out in the arenas of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and, in particular, politics.
From Emmanuel Levinas’s “humanism of the other man”, to Ray Brassier’s meditation on the power of thought and its relation to human extinction, we will address the question: can humanism have anything to say to the citizens of the twenty-first century? If so, which parts of its message should we listen to?
And don’t forget about the Deakin Camus Colloquium on Wednesday 13 October on the Burwood campus.
Deakin Camus Colloquium
Albert Camus, novelist and philosopher
Wednesday 13 October from 9.30am–5pm in room B-LT10 (L1.08), Burwood campus
This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of Albert Camus’ death. In commemoration, philosophy at Deakin University is holding a one day colloquium that brings together philosophers and literary scholars to reflect upon Camus’s philosophical legacy and literary achievements. The event is open and admission is free. For catering purposes we would like to know numbers (a light lunch will be provided), so if you plan on coming please send an email with Camus colloquium in the subject heading to Leesa Davis, leesad@deakin.edu.au, who will also handle any enquiries.
Program:
9.30 Introduction and welcome
9.45 Ashley Woodward (Melbourne School of Continental Philosophy) ‘Camus and Nihilism’
10.45 Jean-Philippe Deranty (Philosophy, Macquarie), ‘Camus’ theory of the flesh’
11.45 Matthew Sharpe (Philosophy, Deakin) ‘“I rebel, therefore we are”: Camus as philosopher, Camus as contemporary’
12.45 Lunch
1.45 Alistair Rolls (French, Newcastle) ‘Reading Camus inside out: L’Étranger as Paris’s other side’
2.45 Russell Grigg (Philosophy, Deakin) ‘Colonising Camus: or, the Arab as the true outsider in L’Étranger’
3.45 Justin Clemens (Culture and Communication, Melbourne) ‘Back up the hill again’
4.45 Close
Check the DPS website or DPS Facebook events page for more event details.
Kind Regards,
Dylan Nickelson,
President, Deakin Philosophical Society.
Dr Liezl van Zyl
Can Virtuous People Emerge from Tragic Dilemmas Having Acted Well?
Wednesday 15 September from 5-6.30pm in ib3.307
This Wednesday 15 September the Deakin Philosophical Society will discuss an article by Dr Liezl van Zyl in preparation for her presentation the following day. ‘Can Virtuous People Emerge from Tragic Dilemmas Having Acted Well?’ is a 2007 article on the question of whether a person can be judged to have acted well when they have to act but are given only two choices, both of which are typically considered morally reprehensible. The article abstract will make the dilemma much clearer:
A tragic dilemma is thought to arise when an agent, through no fault of her own, finds herself in a situation where she must choose between two courses of action, both of which it would be wrong to undertake. I focus on tragic dilemmas that are resolvable, that is, where a reason can be given in favour of one course of action over another, and my aim is to examine whether Hursthouse’s virtue-ethical account of right action succeeds in avoiding two problems presented by tragic dilemmas. The first of these is that they produce the seemingly contradictory conclusion that an agent, in doing what she ought to do, acts wrongly, making it appropriate for her to feel guilt. The second is the paradox of moral luck, which consists in the conflict between the intuition that an agent cannot be held responsible for actions that are not fully voluntary, and the fact that she may nevertheless believe that she has done something morally reprehensible. I argue that if we accept Hursthouse’s separation of action guidance and action assessment, her account succeeds in solving the problem of contradiction. However, it does not completely avoid the problem of moral luck. I argue, against Hursthouse, that the virtuous agent can emerge from a tragic dilemma having acted well, and that this is the conclusion we must arrive at if we want to avoid the problem of contradiction and of moral luck.
Our discussion of the article should give us an understanding of van Zyl’s work prior to her presentation on Thursday (see below). You can also access the article online at www.deakinphilosophicalsociety.com/texts/vanzyl/tragicdilemma.pdf. Hard copies are available on my office door (ic1.211), Waurn Ponds campus.
Dr Liezl van Zyl
Virtue and Right: The Plight of the Non-Virtuous
Thursday 16 September from 3-4.20pm in c2.05 (ArtsEd meeting room), Burwood and videolinked to jb2.107, Waurn Ponds
Dr Liezl van Zyl, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy and Religious Studies at The University of Waikato, New Zealand, will give the next in our series of special presentations. Dr Van Zyl’s presentation is entitled Virtue and Right: The Plight of the Non-Virtuous and will take place on Thursday 16 September from 3-4.20pm in c2.05 (ArtsEd meeting room), Burwood and videolinked to jb2.107 (in the same building as the B-Bar/bistro. You enter the room from the footpath just after the B-Bar on your way towards the KD Stewart Centre/bus stop), Waurn Ponds. Here is an abstract:
Virtue ethicists have long been under pressure to show that, despite its focus on character, it is able to provide an account of right action. In response to this, Aristotelian virtue ethicists – most notably Rosalind Hursthouse – have defined an act as right if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. In this paper I discuss two closely related objections to this criterion, both of which relate to the actions of the non-virtuous. The first is that virtue ethics fails to provide correct action guidance and assessment in cases that involve non-virtuous agents, for in some cases a non-virtuous agent should not do what a virtuous person would characteristically do. A second objection is that virtue ethics altogether fails to provide action guidance and evaluation whenever the agent, through previous wrongdoing, finds herself in circumstances in which a virtuous person cannot be.
Dr van Zyl’s aim is to defend Hursthouse’s account of right action against these objections. She will do so by first drawing attention to the different senses in which the concept ‘right action’ can be used, namely as referring to (a) the act that ought to be done and (b) a good or excellent action. Where (a) is the relevant sense of right action when seeking action guidance, (b) is relevant when assessing an action. Dr Liezl van Zyl will then argue that if we understand ‘right action’ in the second sense, then Hursthouse’s criterion does allow us to accurately assess the actions performed by non-virtuous agents. Finally, when it comes to providing action guidance, Dr Liezl van Zyl agrees that the criterion is inadequate, but argues that this problem can be avoided by viewing it solely as a means of action assessment while turning to the virtue- and vice-rules (v-rules) for action guidance.
Dr van Zyl’s main research interests are virtue ethics and applied ethics, and her focus is on questions that arise when trying to apply virtue ethics. She is the author of Death and Compassion: A virtue-ethical approach to euthanasia (Ashgate, 2000), as well as numerous journal articles.
Dr van Zyl’s presentation is hosted by the Philosophy program in the School of International and Political Studies, the Alfred Deakin Institute and the Deakin Philosophical Society.
Kind Regards,
Dylan Nickelson,
President, Deakin Philosophical Society.
Designer Babies, Week 3
The Political Control of Biotechnology
Wednesday 8 September from 5-6.30pm in ib3.307
This Wednesday, 8 September, from 5-6.30pm in ib3.307 the Deakin Philosophical Society will wrap up its discussion of designer babies and biotechnology with a chapter from Francis Fukuyama’s Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution. In the chapter in question Fukuyama makes the case for regulation of gene technology. Hard copies are available on my office door, ic1.211. The chapter is also available online at www.deakinphilosophicalsociety.com/texts/fukuyama/posthuman.pdf
Fukuyama, F (2002), ‘The Political Control of Biotechnology’, in Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution, Picador, New York, pp. 181-94.
Dr Liezl van Zyl
Virtue and Right: The Plight of the Non-Virtuous
Thursday 16 September from 3-4.20pm in c2.05 (ArtsEd meeting room), Burwood and videolinked to jb2.107, Waurn Ponds
Dr Liezl van Zyl, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy and Religious Studies at The University of Waikato, New Zealand, will give the next in our series of special presentations. Dr Van Zyl’s presentation is entitled Virtue and Right: The Plight of the Non-Virtuous and will take place on Thursday 16 September from 3-4.20pm in c2.05 (ArtsEd meeting room), Burwood and videolinked to jb2.107, Waurn Ponds. Here is an abstract:
Virtue ethicists have long been under pressure to show that, despite its focus on character, it is able to provide an account of right action. In response to this, Aristotelian virtue ethicists – most notably Rosalind Hursthouse – have defined an act as right if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. In this paper I discuss two closely related objections to this criterion, both of which relate to the actions of the non-virtuous. The first is that virtue ethics fails to provide correct action guidance and assessment in cases that involve non-virtuous agents, for in some cases a non-virtuous agent should not do what a virtuous person would characteristically do. A second objection is that virtue ethics altogether fails to provide action guidance and evaluation whenever the agent, through previous wrongdoing, finds herself in circumstances in which a virtuous person cannot be.
Dr van Zyl’s aim is to defend Hursthouse’s account of right action against these objections. She will do so by first drawing attention to the different senses in which the concept ‘right action’ can be used, namely as referring to(a) the act that ought to be done and (b) a good or excellent action. Where (a) is the relevant sense of right action when seeking action guidance, (b) is relevant when assessing an action. Dr Liezl van Zyl will then argue that if we understand ‘right action’ in the second sense, then Hursthouse’s criterion does allow us to accurately assess the actions performed by non-virtuous agents. Finally, when it comes to providing action guidance, Dr Liezl van Zyl agree that the criterion is inadequate, but argue that this problem can be avoided by viewing it solely as a means of action assessment while turning to the virtue- and vice-rules (v-rules) for action guidance.
Dr van Zyl’s main research interests are virtue ethics and applied ethics, and her focus is on questions that arise when trying to apply virtue ethics. She is the author of Death and Compassion: A virtue-ethical approach to euthanasia (Ashgate, 2000), as well as numerous journal articles.
Dr van Zyl’s presentation is hosted by the Philosophy program in the School of International and Political Studies, the Alfred Deakin Institute and the Deakin Philosophical Society.
Kind Regards,
Dylan Nickelson,
President, Deakin Philosophical Society.
